Tuesday, April 19, 2005

dourish ch 5

Quickly now ...


"This chapter has two goals. The first is to open up
the notion of embodiment and explore the set of ideas that it brings
together.
In particular, the notion of "meaning" that featured so
strongly
in the last chapter needs to be examined more closely. Just what
aspects of
meaning are important, and how are they conveyed through embodied
interaction?" (p.
128).
Ok, that's cool.



  • three aspects of meaning:

    • ontology: (the study of the nature of being and
      categories of
      existence (p. 103)) an emergent phenomenon of describing one's
      reality, that
      arises and is revised through experience, closely tied to
      epistemology (the
      study of knowledge (p. 103)). Dourish suggests ontology can be
      designed (p.
      130), but I think he means redesigned or
      modified.

    • intersubjectivity: the problem of sharing ontology
      between
      two or more people -- difficult because we all have our own
      unique perspectives
      (epistemic frames? (shaffer?)) based on our unique empiric and
      social
      experiences in life. Dourish talks about this sharing from
      designer to
      user, between users through the system (eg. email, or IM), and
      I'd suggest
      that a third is from user to designer (in iterative design at
      least).

    • intentionality: what was meant. That with which the
      road to
      hell is paved. the disconnect in intersubjectivity. Franz
      Brentano (discussed
      on p 136), spoke of original intentionality (what the
      person
      meant) and others (Dourish?) speak of derived
      intentionality
      (what others thought the person meant). (If you've ever been in
      a loving
      relationship where people got hurt, this is all pretty jargon
      for pretty
      intuitive stuff.) Dennett (1987) says it's all derived, and
      based on
      Lucy Suchman's (1987) href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/
      index%3Dstripbooks%26field-keywords%3Dlucy%20suchman%26results-
      process%3Ddefault%26dispatch%3Dsearch/ref%3Dpd%5Fsl%5Faw%5Ftops
      -1%5Fstripbooks%5F7117809%5F2/102-6558293-8461750">Plans
      and Situated Actions
      , I'd bet that others would
      agree, that
      even the original actor (actant?) often only considers
      intention after the
      action.



  • Intentionality, then sets up a relationship between embodied
    action and
    meaning (p. 138), which brings up the notion of Coupling
    -- maintaining
    the relationship. For example: I turn a key that starts the SUV
    that burns
    the gas that's made from the oil that's under Iraq that worries
    Bush that
    starts a war that kills or maims my neighbor's son. Coupling makes
    me the
    problem. Buddhist's get this. They call it karma. Maybe
    that's the
    angle Varela and company take, but I won't find out this
    semester...

  • of course it's not that simple, because one's focus shifts
    throughout the
    process. So, for example, when I want to go to the corner store,
    I may
    not think about my neighbor's dead son, but instead think about how
    nice
    it would be to have a cold Coke quickly. Or when I turn off the
    SUV, I may
    think about saving money rather than cutting down on pollution.

  • I act on things, through things, and
    focus on
    different points of the coupled chain of happenings, depending on
    the context
    (p. 141).

  • Dourish touches on Lakoff and Johnson's Metaphors We Live
    By
    and
    the role of metaphor in how we describe our world (ontology).

  • I'd say that intentionality is the place where symbolic IP
    understanding
    of embodiment varies from Dourish's, but Doonesbury's handling of
    the Apple
    Newton's handwriting recognition (derived intention) at least
    partly -- although
    it doesn't address the emotional aspects/consequences of it.

  • embodied interaction is both a basis for an approach to design
    (discussed
    in ch6), and a stance -- a way to use existing embodied
    understandings
    of technologies in the design of new ones (a seat in a car is
    recognizable
    as a seat because of the body's understanding of chairs). The
    desktop metaphor
    in computer GUI is another example.

  • "The goal throughout is not to propose a theory per se of
    embodied interaction,
    but rather to build a foundation for analysis and design" (p.
    153) --
    great, no theory.

0 Comments:

Post a Comment

<< Home